Before Pac Man, Pong, or Space Invaders, there was Igloo White, the original computer video
game, where the loser paid in real blood, so that the winner did not have to.
Introduction
The importance of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail as the primary means of supply for prosecuting a counter-insurgency
campaign in South Vietnam has been discussed at length elsewhere. The actual
method by which the United States and its Allies accomplished that is however,
less detailed because of its previously highly Classified status. Thirty years
after the fact, this material is now being declassified (technically called
downgrading - to UNCLASSIFIED status), and sheds a whole new light on the
subject.
Where North Vietnam had no airborne delivery
capability, the two options left to them that they pursued were supply by land
and by water. The coastal routes of Vietnam and throughout the inland waterway
and Mekong river systems were monitored and interdicted by South Vietnamese and
allied U.S. Navy operations. River-watch programs by police and military
authorities were implemented, and land routes across the Demilitarized Zone
into South Vietnam were interrupted so well that the use of other countries not
originally involved with the conflict became the primary means of prosecuting
the invasion. The ensuing involvement of Laos and Cambodia as delivery routes
violated various international treaties and accords. It was recognized early
that North Vietnam and their organized insurgency into Laos and Cambodia did
not subscribe to accepted international rules. Although many supplies still got
through to regular and provisional communist forces in South Vietnam, the
interdiction of these supply lines saved thousands of American and Allied lives
from death and injury.
Inception
[It must be noted at the outset of this discussion that a major
paradigm shift occurred in strategic doctrine in 1968 regarding the use of the
sensors in Southeast Asia that changed the whole nature of the U.S. response to
insurgency in South Vietnam, and military activities in Southeast Asia in
general. It has been suggested by some that this one action alone may have
changed the final outcome of the Vietnam War itself.
It occurred at the Joint-Chiefs level at the Pentagon, and
contrasted with the strategic policy that had been previously planned and
implemented by the various scientific and advisory committees to the President
of the United States.
Similar to successful British anti-communist insurgency operations in Malaya
and Burma, Vietnam might well have remained a low-level counter-insurgency
operation maintained by a relatively small number of U.S. Special Forces
advisors with air support, instead of the eventual massive introduction of
conventional military operations that occurred.
Additionally, changes in procurement and scientific studies within the DoD
forced a reorganization of contract coordination for all federally funded
contract studies for scientific and applied engineering research (see “A History of the Department
of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers”, attached).]
In August 1966, a civilian scientific study group
(The Jason Group) was solicited to submit a
proposal discussing a broad air-supported anti-personnel barrier system across
Vietnam below the Demilitarized Zone. The Jasons, as the were known
In September 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert
Strange McNamara established the Defense
Communications Planning Group to develop the concept, and later
expanded the mission scope to cover an anti-vehicle barrier system across
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by a variety of tactical applications with a variety
of sensors. Sonobuoys were already in Navy use as part of the Jezebel ASW (anti-submarine warfare) program
- essentially a computer-aided audio spectrum analyzer. The system recorded and
maintained a database of acoustic signatures of surface and submarine target
vessels. Individual vessel names were routinely identified and cataloged for
later recall by acoustic 'fingerprint'.
The U.S. Navy adapted the air-dropped radio sonobuoy for ground use by
replacing the hydrophones with microphones and geophones, and modifying
existing ASW aircraft for over-land use to accomplish the mission. The initial
phase was called ALARS (Air-Launched Acoustical Reconnaissance), later to
become known as Project TRIM (Trails and Road Interdiction, Multi-sensor).
Recognition
The wide variety of Code-names and Call-signs associated with the overall
Igloo White program confuses the clarity of the subject, as all good security
programs should.
The very nature of Classified operations themselves imparts information only on
a 'need to know' basis regardless of the participants' clearance-level. Even
the staff working inside the Task Force Alpha facility were limited on which
rooms they could enter, and accessed information only necessary for their
specific duties. For the sake of simplicity, off duty personnel did not enquire
into the nature of their associates' work in too much detail, and did not
customarily associate or talk with, other service personnel outside of the
hemisphere of their immediate shift or work crew.
Additionally, the fact that most personnel served for only one year in
Southeast Asia limited knowledge to a very narrow few at a time. On the broader
front, mission activities were assigned to many different specialty units of
the armed services over a decade. Complicating an understanding of the overall
program was the fact that one organization would replace or absorb another's
mission when it changed, or as one technology would supercede the other.
Identification
The overall management and prosecution of the Trail
Interdiction program was the responsibility of a joint task-force of
Army, Navy and Air Force commands tasked by the Department
of Defense to integrate their respective intelligence gathering and
targeting programs under one mission.
Operational identification was initially listed on
DOD organizational charts as Joint Task Force 728. The initial
sensor air delivery and attack portion of the program was managed by the U.S.
Navy under the code-name Dual Blade, later changing to Dye Marker, and again to Muscle
Shoals. Upon transfer of mission to the Air Force in June 1968 under the expanding umbrella of the 'air war', the ground
unit identification was changed to Task Force Alpha and the overall
electronic warfare program of dropping sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail was known as Igloo White.
The Sensors
In Southeast Asia, the problem with seismic
sensors wasn't their sensitivity - their ability to pick up the soil
disturbance produced by humans walking or trucks rumbling down the Ho Chi
Minh trail. The problem was all the other noise-producing seismic signals;
earth tremors, wind, thunder, rain, bombs, artillery, aircraft and especially
helicopters, kept the ground vibrating and created seismic sensor nuisance
alarms galore. HANDSIDs
It is estimated that some 36,000 ADSID and
ACOUSID sensors were produced by just one of the contributing manufacturers
involved.
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Application
The ADSID III shown in the photograph above is typical of the devices dropped
from U.S. aircraft along roads, rivers, and jungle trails in Southeast Asia.
They were dropped in sequential 'strings' along a predetermined target line in
a series of from 4, up to 10, 12, 15 or sometimes more, depending on the
priority of the target area. With their flexible spring-steel antennas, they
were designed to bury in the ground and blend into the surrounding foliage by
resembling tree branches and plants. All devices transmitted alarm data for
only a short distance. They were continuously monitored twenty-four hours a day
by U.S. Air Force crewmen flying unarmed, propeller - driven electronic
surveillance aircraft orbiting overhead at 20,000ft.
Initially, Navy OP-2E Neptune aircraft performed sensor air deliveries at very
slow speeds from altitudes as low as 500 feet, making them easy targets for
enemy gunfire. The pilots of VO-67 at Nakhon Phanom AB knowingly anticipated
that they would incur as high as an 85% casualty rate from such operations, but
volunteered to fly them anyway, and many crewmen were lost.
During later operations, sensors were hand-dropped from CH-3 Jolly Green Giant
helicopters by personnel of the 21st SOS Dust Devils (Special Operations
Squadron) and later, delivered by Air Force F-4D Phantom IIs.
In addition to air delivery operations, South Vietnamese Special Forces 'Spike'
teams, coordinated by MACVSOG Heavy Hook operations out of Nakhon
Phanom, carried and hand-implanted GSIDS in Laos and Cambodia in the course of
their other reconnaisance and Road-Watch activities in the Prairie Fire
and Daniel Boone operational areas. The sensors were monitored from
four constantly manned aerial orbits over Southeast Asia by Lockheed EC-121R
radio relay aircraft that then retransmitted the data over S-band radio link to
the ground Intelligence Surveillance Center (ISC) at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai
Air Force Base, Thailand. Flight operations continued 24-hours a day with
varying new generations of aircraft platform from 15 February 1967 until mid
1975.
On 24 November 1970, a Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee completed
and published an Investigation into the Electronic Battlefield Program,
detailing development and use of remote surveillance sensors to locate hostile
forces in Vietnam.
On 21 February 1971, the Navy disclosed that that they had been using remote
sensors in Vietnam since June of 1967. Acoubuoy and Spikebuoy were
said to be able to transmit up to 20 miles.
OP-2E aircraft
Twelve Lockheed SP-2H Neptune ASW airframes were modified for Trail
Interdiction in 1967 and re-designated OP-2E observation aircraft. Paint
schemes varied:
(1) all black, (1) all green, (2) all gray; and all four carried the same
equipment:
The fuselage underbelly ASW radome and MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detector) tail
'stinger' assemblies were removed. A tail gunner compartment was installed with
NOS (Night Observation Scope) and a twin 20mm cannon turret. The underbelly ASW
radome area was enlarged to accommodate AN/APQ-92 search radar equipment. FLIR
(Forward looking Infra-Red) and LLLTV (Low Light-Level Television) sensors were
mounted in forward chin fairings. SLAR (Side Looking Airborne Radar) was
pod-mounted either side of the fuselage aft of the wing trailing edge.
Additional equipment included an Infra Red imaging sensor, airborne MTI (Moving
Target Indicator), DIANE (Digital Integrated Attack and Navigation Equipment),
and Black-Crow vehicle ignition detectors. Armament included:
(2) Forward-firing SUU-11/A Mini-gun pods,
(2) Mk82 500lb General Purpose bombs,
(2) Mk77 incendiary bombs mounted outboard on under-wing pylons.
Although armed with a pair of Mini-gun pods under
the wings, OP-2E's were not 'gunships' in the classic sense of the term. The
OP-2E mission was sensor air delivery, coordinated with AP-2H attack aircraft.
OP-2E's were fitted with multiple ejector racks just outboard of the
reciprocating engines, with additional sensors carried in racks in the bomb
bay.
On 15 February 1967, four OP-2E's with tail identification code MR were
assigned to Navy Observation Squadron OBSRON Sixty Seven (VO-67) - were
operationally assigned to Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand where they flew TRIM
missions using the call sign Sophomore until 1 July 1968. Both reciprocating
and turboprop engines were extensively muffled after the aircraft were deployed
to the war zone in 1968. Missions were flown against targets inside Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos, along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
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Twelve aircraft were
returned to CONUS in 1969 where they were decommissioned at Davis-Monthan AFB.
Some remain on display at the Pima Air Museum, Tucson, Arizona. |
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AP-2H Attack aircraft
Four Lockheed Neptune ASW aircraft were
reengined to OP-2E specifications and converted to AP-2H's by E-Systems Corp.
at the U.S. Naval Weapons Center. The ASW radomes and MAD stingers were also
removed as with the OP-2E's. AN/ALE-29 chaff dispensers were mounted in the
tails for SAM counter-measures, and a chin-mount radome housing was installed
to accommodate AN/APQ-31 target acquisition radar arrays under the nose. Eight
40mm Honeywell XM-149 belt-fed automatic grenade launchers were mounted at a
forward slant-angle in the bomb bay that produced a wide-area downward spray of
fire. Paint schemes all followed the Navy three-tone grey camouflage pattern.
Click here to see
AP-2H photos on Eric B. Shuyer's VAH-21 Page
On 31 August 1968 the first AP2-H's with tail identification code SL were
assigned to Navy Attack Squadron HATRON Twenty One (VAH-21) at Cam Ranh Bay.
Between 1 September 1968 and 16 June 1969, VAH-21 flew over 200 missions,
mostly against road and river traffic in the Parrot's Beak area of the Mekong
Delta.
BATCAT Radio Relay
aircraft
The 553rd Reconaissance Wing was
assigned with aircraft to Korat AB, Thailand and flew airborne signals relay
missions with a crew manifest of seventeen on four color-coded orbits around
the clock for every day of operations in Southeast Asia.
The aircraft were four-engined Lockheed 1049 Super-Constellation airframes
upgraded from similar EC-121K and -121P models similar to those used by College
Eye at the 552nd AEW&C Wing at Korat. Aircraft had the upper aerial
height-finder radar and lower search radar domes removed from the dorsal and
ventral positions and special electronics, wingtip, and fuselage blade antennae
were installed. The aircraft carried 13 multichannel communications
transceivers:
(5) UHF/AM band; AN/ARC-27
(2) UHF/AM band; AN/ARC-51BX
(2) VHF/AM band; Wilcox model 807B
(2) VHF/FM band; AN/VRC-46
(2) HF /SSB band; Collins 618T
BATCAT was the call-sign used, flting overland and off
the coast of Vietnam, over Laos and Cambodia, monitoring and retransmitting the
low-power sensor signals. Low power served a number of purposes - low current
drain meant low battery weight and a reasonably long sensor life. Signal
reception laterally across terrain was very poor unless the receiver was close,
so the best reception was from an aircraft overhead. Since North Vietnam used
the resources of the Soviet, Chinese and North Korean electronics intelligence
community, it was important to obscure the sensor locations from radio
direction finding (RDF) capability, and also important to obscure the function
of the ISC at Nakhon Phanom from targeting by the NVA.
The typical Batcat mission profile usually tasked
aircrews for more than eighteen hours at a time:
- Mission briefing: ½ hr.
- Standby alert: 4hrs.
- Transit flight to station: 2-¼ hrs.
- On-station signals intercept/relay operations: 8 hrs.
- Return to base: 2-¼ hrs.
- Mission debriefing: 1 to 1-½ hrs.
Flight crews reported to pre-flight briefing to
get the daily information for their assigned orbit and to also get briefed on
the day's activities on the other three stations. The flight crew would then
sit a four-hour alert in case one of the on-station Batcats had to abort and
return to base. Under normal conditions they would take off at their regularly
scheduled time and fly to their assigned station.
The aircraft carried a crew of five radio
operators - a 'flight boss', or CICO (Combat Information Control Officer), and
four CIMs (Combat Information Monitors) were connected to the CICO by intercom.
Each console held eight AN/ARR-52(V) sonobuoy receiver sets - four mounted
high, and four mounted lower down, in front of each operator. The CICO operated
the HF radios and the ARC-51 /ARC-109 with voice encryption. Datalink equipment
for retransmission to Task Force Alpha consisted of an S-band AN/ARC-89 using a
pod antenna located under the left fuselage wing root.
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All aircraft were
equipped with AN/APR-25, -26 radar homing and warning (RHAW) ground- threat
receiver systems, but only a few aircraft had substantial, active ECM suites.
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The four monitoring orbits over those areas were
color-coded. Up until September 1968 Batcat orbit codes were as follows:
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Blue Orbit |
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E/W track south of the
DMZ over Khe San - primary during the Tet of '68. |
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Purple Orbit |
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N/S track 20m. E of
the Mu Gia /Ban Karai 'chokepoints'. |
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Black Orbit |
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E/W track just south
of the DMZ over Dong Ha and Con Thien. |
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Pink Orbit |
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N/S track 20m. E of
the N. Vietnamese coastline, just above the DMZ. |
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Later, the orbits were
changed: |
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Blue Orbit |
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N/S track over the PDJ
(Plaine Des Jarres). |
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Purple Orbit |
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N/S track 20m. E of
the Mu Gia /Ban Karai 'chokepoints'. |
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Green Orbit |
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E/W track just south
of the DMZ. |
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???? Orbit |
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N/S track between
Pleiku and the Cambodian border. |
While en-route, each CIM would set their R-1170/ARR
receivers to the pre-assigned frequencies of whichever of the four orbits they
were to work. 27 individual sensor addresses could be received on any one of
the 40 designated radio channels in the 160-175 MHz VHF radio band. Sensors
radiated a two watt FM alarm that illuminated a numbered light on the CIM
console, and identified itself every few seconds while they picked up activity.
Spikebuoy seismic sensors were activated by ground vibrations. Acoubuoy
acoustic sensors were activated by ambient noise, and a 'press-to-activate'
green light would illuminate on the CIM console. Pressing it would allow the
radio operator to listen in and record whatever sound was being made around the
sensor.
The receiver 'sensor active' display lamp-field consisted of a plastic
honeycomb lamp holder of with 27 bulbs arrayed in three rows:
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01 |
02 |
03 |
04 |
05 |
06 |
07 |
08 |
09 |
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11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
16 |
17 |
18 |
19 |
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21 |
22 |
23 |
24 |
25 |
26 |
27 |
28 |
29 |
The black screen lamp cover had the numerals
etched in, and each indicator on the lamp field had a small spring-loaded
toggle switch. Upon illuminating, the CIMs would mark 'X's on a spreadsheet
log, then quickly toggle the lamp switch to clear the illuminated lights on
each of the eight ARR-52s.
The CIMCO position (Combat Information Control Officer) had a plexiglas
plotting board across the aisle from him, pre-configured to display the day's
assigned geographic and operational information. The roads and positions of the
sensors were plotted on the board and when movement was detected, it was added
to the board. Batcat was a radio relay aircraft, and the S-band repeater used a
Radiation Systems Corporation multiplexer that automatically scanned the 40
ARR-52 receivers, passing the tone-codes along on datalink to the ISC ground
station.
Upon arrival, the relief bird would contact the
flight on-station via Secure Voice and then join them in orbit. They would then
advise the ISC Command Post, who would set one of the four S-band dish antennas
into 'Search' mode. During a coordinated ten-count, the on-station Batcat would
terminate transmission while the relief bird switched on. After TFA reported lock-on,
the on-station Batcat would be relieved from their 8-hour watch, depart the
orbit pattern, and fly the two-plus hours back to Korat, where they would be
debriefed and stand down until their next scheduled watch.
During debrief, they would get the chance to tell what had been heard on the
acoustic sensors and what had been picked up from any air-war radio chatter.
The increasing intensity of AAA and SAM activity over the trails jeopardized
Batcat flights, but none were lost to hostile fire. Two EC-121R's crashed at
Korat AB during flight operations. The entire crew of eighteen was lost on
April 25, 1969, and four fatalities occurred during a second crash on Sept. 6,
1969.
Their names are to be found on the Vietnam Memorial, Washington, D.C.
In July/August 1970 the 553rd Tactical
Reconaissance Wing was deactivated - reduced in size down to 553rd Tactical
Reconaissance Squadron, and transferred on paper subordinate to the 388th
Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat, Thailand.
Click here to see
Larry Westin's 553 TRW (BATCAT) Page
The author, Donald Born (Bat Cat Task Force)
refered to the Batcat aircraft with an 'AC' not the 'EC' prefix, and mentioned
that the 'AC-121s' were painted all-black. The AC-prefix designated combat
attack aircraft, and gunships like the AC-47 Spooky had the same
camouflage scheme as the EC-121R Batcat above. Some AC-130 Spectre
gunships were painted Night-Ops black. Some other types of Navy and USAF
reconnaissance aircraft (not discussed here) also used all-black paint schemes,
but no Lockheed Super-Constellations were modified into night operations gunships.
Mini-Bat
Batcat flights were
replaced by a joint USAF/DARPA program code-named Pave Eagle that was
phased in for operational field trials in 1970. Under the program, six Beech
A-36 Debonaire airframes were modified as YQU-22A development aircraft.
Later, one was designated as YAU-22A, and twenty seven were produced as QU-22B
aircraft, intended to be operated as pilotless drones. A Detachment of 554th
Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn flew the airborne signals reception missions out of
both Udorn and Nakhon Phanom RTAFB . Between 1970 and 1972, six aircraft were
lost through mechanical failure, and one from pilot hypoxia.
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Note the
distinct generator cowling bulge on the front that housed the AC generator to
satisfy the heavy power requirements. Some QU-22 aircraft are still to be
found at the DMAFB /Pima Air Museum, Tucson Arizona. |
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DART
Records indicate that
when the Pave Eagle program closed, QU-22 'Quackers' had
never flown operationally as pilotless drones as initially programmed. Reliable
eyewitness accounts indicate that they were seen flying pilotless on occasion,
but other information indicates that the Commander at NKP issued a standing
order that none were to be flown operationally without a pilot.
The Pave Eagle program concluded that the aircraft was underpowered
and overloaded for the mission requirements and eventually terminated.
Newer, lighter electronics being fielded at the time allowed for a more
widespread use of sensors as tactical battlefield assets and allowed the airborne
sensor reception mission to be subsumed by the C-130 ABCCC program in operation
at the time.
At about the same time, mobile receiver shelters known as DART vans were
deployed in South Vietnam and Thailand, providing a reduced-scope tactical
field version of the ISC at Task Force Alpha, which eventually suspended
operations in that guise (See USSAG). The DART sensor display consisted of a
100-pin electrostatic chart recorder that printed out sensor alarm information
in an effort to provide 'real time' information to Army and Marine ground
forces using both air-delivered and 81mm mortar-delivered battlefield sensors.
This then, was the initial development of what later became known as the
REMBASS generation of remote monitored ground sensors - incorporating more
sophisticated and flexible digital technology.
Igloo White
Isolated on the East
side of Nakhon Phanom RTAFB stood a facility only originally referred to as
'The Project'. In 1968 it was said to be the largest single building in
Southeast Asia, built and later maintained by the construction company of
Parsons, Inc. under the supervision of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
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The air-conditioned ISC facility
buildings were located above-ground but protected from rocket attack by
earth-filled ARMCO corrugated steel revetments around them. The TFA complex
was guarded by perimeter and building security teams, dual - perimeter
cyclone fencing and razor wire. |
The men and women who worked in the
ISC (Infiltration Surveillance Center) inside the Task Force Alpha compound were
tasked with analyzing raw sensor intelligence data, determining the nature of
activity on the Trail. They then directed the destruction of combat equipment,
supplies, NVA troops, truck convoys, truck parks and marshalling areas. Igloo
White was possibly one of the most important classified operations of the
Vietnam war.
Access to the environmentally
controlled building was afforded via the main security lobby that also doubled
as an airlock entrance and changing-room, where twelve inch-square pidgeon-hole
bins stored individually name-labeled white KEDS sneakers for all TFA
personnel. As with any comparable data processing facility of that era,
positive pressurization was necessary to prevent contamination and corrosion of
sensitive electro-mechanical data processing equipment. Reel-to-reel tape
drives, removable hard-disk drives, storage vaults, punch-card readers, and
inumerable relays in 1960's-era computers made for high-maintainence systems.
Paper dust and chaff from fan-fold printers and the teletypes in the
communications vault produced a lot of contamination. The super-fine red clay
dust and humidity of northeast Thailand made it even more important to maintain
a well-controlled and clean working environment.
Maintenance of air-conditioning filters and chiller pumps was always a
high-priority for the facility Central Plant, but because of the 24-hour nature
of operations, some important systems were run to failure rather than taken
off-line to meet scheduled preventative maintenance requirements. For security
reasons, only off-duty TFA personnel of rank E-5 and above were allowed to
perform the housekeeping in the facility, where they constantly mopped floors
and cleaned the consoles and work areas. Contract civilian IBM computer
maintenance staff were constantly accessing the computer sub-floor area for
equipment maintenance or cable routing, with the numerous systems upgrades, and
the underfloor plenum areas remained much cleaner than the average data
processing facility. Poisonous snakes and flies still found their way in,
causing some excitement, and staff were occasionally reprimanded for shooting
rubber bands at the flies during the moments of boredom that is every soldier's
fate. Consuming beverages, food or smoking was not allowed on the computer
floors, but only in the break area outside. Staff seldom left the compound for
lunch. Most either ate C-rations, boxed lunches assembled and delivered from
the base chow hall, or sandwiches and sodas purchased from a small snack bar
installed outside later on.
Operational ground-to-air communications were accomplished with a suite of
secure VHF and UHF radio transceivers using KY-8 and KY-28 NESTOR
voice-encryption systems. Remote sensor information was received from relay
aircraft by means of the four tower-mounted, black S-Band satellite dish
antennas. Their odd habit of being constantly oriented horizontally, pointing
East (instead of pointing up into the sky for assumed satellites) solicited the
code name of 'Dutch Mill'.
Each dish would lock onto an individual datalink signal being transmitted from
the four Batcat aircraft flying concurrently on different stations over
Southeast Asia.
On duty, Intelligence Officers and
Specialists scrutinized consoles and rows of video displays - part of a sophisticated
dual IBM 360/Model 65 computer system. Data was stored and retrieved from
free-standing Model 2400, 9-track reel-to-reel tape drives and DASD removable
hard-disk drives. Disks were installed and removed in stacked disk carriers
with clear lexan dust covers that looked like cake covers (they were called
'wedding cakes'). One of the two computers was usually used to collate and
process electronic intelligence and status reports for various commands around
the world while serving as 'hot back-up' for the primary computer that
constantly recorded and processed the trail sensor alarm data relayed from the
aircraft. The System 360 computers at TFA were not used to perform direct data
analysis at that time, but stored and printed out the information fed to them
manually by Enlisted computer operations staff working in the Computer Room.
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The
environment of the separate War Room was reminiscent of, and modeled upon the
dimmed operations darkrooms of the Air Defense Command BMEWS (Ballistic
Missile Early Warning) SAGE system centers in the United States. The same
gray IBM 2250 display scopes were arranged in rows with their pistol-grip
light guns, adjustable console lamping and desktop illumination. Sitting at
the consoles with headsets clamped to their ears, faces lit by the glow of
the displays, the enlisted CIM-G's (Combat Information Monitor - Ground)
monitored real-time alarms relayed from sensors that triggered by activity on
the ground. The sequentially-tripped sensors would appear on the CRT's as
moving white snail-trails, superimposed on coordinate map grids. |
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IBM 2250 display
console (photo not from inside TFA) |
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Other enlisted staff reproduced this
information on a 24-foot high, 9-foot wide plexiglas 'Big Board' map of the
slowly growing Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trail complex leading to South Vietnam.
It was a misnomer to speak of 'The trail' when in fact, it was a web of roads,
trail paths and waterways. There were literally thousands of small by-ways that
comprized the 'Ho Chi Minh Trail'.
Although sensor alarm data was being relayed from
Batcat in real-time, CIM-Gs could not punch in and listen directly to sensor
microphones, but Batcat CIMs could. Batcat flights recorded all audio on tape
at 15/16 ips then shipped some of them to TFA for analysis by the Intelligence
group after landing.
Under the TRIM program, not only could the ISC certainly differentiate between
civilian and military vehicles, but experienced personnel could acoustically
identify the exact vehicle, by type, make and model. Individual vehicles were
identified repeatedly traveling up and down the Trail if they had some unique,
acoustically descriptive loose part on them. Sometimes the condition of the
engines was noted. Each vehicle and engine had a distinct signature on the
scope.
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Task Force
Alpha owned a captured ZIL-157 - a heavy-duty Soviet military truck. Sensors
were planted along unimproved roads off-base and monitored directly with a
receiver at the ISC for training purposes. The truck was employed making runs
past the various sensor strings to hone the skills of the ISC surveillance
staff on Soviet and Chinese vehicle signature recognition. |
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Soviet ZIL-157
at TFA. Photos courtesy of
Ken Grizwold |
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This truck had
originally served as a mobile repair shop for NVA vehicles on the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. Note tire-inflation devices on the wheel hubs (1968). The circumstances
of it's acquisition are unknown, but other Soviet hardware was transported to
NKP from Laos and Vietnam by helicopter. |
It is reported that response times
between sensor activity and mission strike could occur in as little as five minutes,
but it would not have been considered prudent to so precisely 'telegraph' the
sensor locations to enemy intelligence by such cause-and-effect activity.
Although it did happen on occasion, in reality, politics and painstaking - some
assert 'overly cautious' - analysis played a larger hand in governing those
technically accurate claims.
Trucks were clocked travelling at an average speed of 1.8 nm/hr along the
Trail, and as soon as the mainframe had calculated the vehicles' speed and
direction of travel past the sensors, they ran a forcasting subroutine for
predicting target location in the near future (referred to as 'Time and
Distance'). Intelligence officers
would then submit their analysis to the FACLO (Forward Air Control Liaison
Officer) for communication (called Spotlight Reports)
to Headquarters, 7th AF and MACV in Saigon for buy-in, final approval, and
mission tasking back down the chain of command via the PIACCS and CREST
data networks (see Other High Technology Assets, below).
When scoured again by national policy
directives originating in real-time from Washington D.C., the strike missions
would eventually be authorized.
It is not an exaggeration of fact that every service member in Southeast Asia
heard the complaint; "...Helluva way to run a War!..."
For circumstances demanding immediate response (requiring heavy post-strike
justification by the TFA shift OIC), the FACLO would authorize a strike mission
directly from the ISC, and target grid coordinates would be given to attack
aircraft patrolling the night over Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
It is reported that Batcat mission flight officers had occasionally directly
vectored sucessful strikes on targets considered inconclusive at the time by
TFA Intelligence analysts, causing much political controversy between Task
Force Alpha, HQ 7th AF and 553rd Tactical Reconnaisance Wing (Batcat). But
success has its own rewards, and the politics, outside the scope of this paper.
It is noted however, that TFA Intelligence analysis was mistaken in some of
their logistical expectations of the NVA effort.
They were confused when vehicles acoustically identified at certain
sensor-monitored points would disappear before arriving at the next predicted
sensor monitor point. They had made the erroneous assumption that the NVA
transport procedures were like American orthodoxy - that cargo and supplies
would form up in truck convoys in Hanoi or Haiphong and drive uninterrupted,
straight down to Saigon. Due to the success of Trail interdiction however,
bridges at rivers, and roads through mountain passes had been made thoroughly
un-navigable by wheeled vehicles, and cargo had to be hand- or bicycle-carried
to truck convoys marshalled on the other side of the given 'choke' point. This
resulted in what was at best, a truck shuttle system, with many byways, side
trails, and truck parks performing cargo transfers from one convoy to the
other.
Over time, enemy counter-intelligence activities against the Igloo White
Trail-watch and interdiction program involved disabling - but more frequently -
'spoofing' sensors into producing false alarms in continued efforts to misguide
Intelligence analysts and obscure NVA convoy activities. The role of allied
counter-counter-intelligence against such activities thus led to endless
permutations of corroboration or rebuttal of information by alternate
supporting intelligence-gathering methods that is the real nature of military
intelligence.
Attack operations were not limited to
just the aircraft identified in this narrative. Numerous other types of Navy
and Air Force aircraft were involved in bombing operations, with the ISC
fielding a bewildering array of call-signs and code names.
Navy 'carrier-based A-6's for instance, contacted the ISC under the call-sign 'Copperhead'.
Another call-sign used was 'Moonbeam'.
When USAF assumed responsibility for the TRIM program, the Navy AP-2H aircraft
were supplemented and eventually replaced by the Air Force A-26 'Invader',
AC-47 'Spooky', and AC-119 'Shadow' truck-killer gunships. As
time and technology progressed into the '70's, Navy F-4 and A6 fighter-bombers,
Air Force AC-130 'Spectre' gunships, and F-4D 'PAVE Phantom II's
using the new 'Towel Rack' LORAN navigation system were implimented.
Targeting was also accomplished using radar-assisted bombing navigation systems
located in various locations in Southeast Asia.
|
Tactical
Radar Bombing Systems |
|
|
|
|
|
AN/MSQ-77: Managed by
Detachments of 1 CEVG (SAC) under the Project name COMBAT SKYSPOT, a number
of MSQ-77s, a TSQ-81 and the radically upgraded TSQ-96 Auto-track radar
bombing systems provided the ability to accurately bomb targets at night or
during inclement weather over Southeast Asia. |
|
Vietnam: |
AN/TSQ-96 inside the INVERT compound
at NKP (
For details on Operation Heavy Green
and the loss of USAF personnel there, search on Lima Site 85, - or - |
The MSQ-77 radar was a SAC system used originally
for radar bomb-scoring. Ground-based SAC bombing range facilities would
supervise and QC aircraft bombing reports for their training program. Results
from the essentially manually voice-command guided MSQ-77 and TSQ-81 operations
in their radar-directed bombing role were in fact good, but many ground and air
limitations underscored the need for a system specifically engineered to
perform the developing radar bombing mission.
The TSQ-96 system was custom-built exclusively for that mission.
The optically calibrated, narrow-beam I-band radar would perform a search
pattern at a predetermined acquisition point where the aircraft would arrive
for target guidance. Once locked on, command guidance was accomplished by
either the Ops Officer or Crew Chief giving voice corrections to the lead
aircraft in the cell, left or right of track , with an eventual ordnance
release count down of , “...three, two, one - Hack!” The Skyspot
crew plotted the inbound track on the computer's plotting board, along with the
VIP (vacuum impact point - a theoretical trajectory exclusive of air /wind
resistance factors) and the RP (release point).
With radar and target
latitude, longitude and altitude programmed into the 50's era vacuum-tube
computer, the TSQ-96 compensated for Coriolis' force at that Parallel, and
factored in the inertial flight characteristics of the type of ordnance in use.
Theoretically, all the pilot had to do otherwise was watch for SAMs and AAA and
observe the target activity below. In practice though, flying straight and
level in zero-zero visibility at low altitude for seemingly interminable
amounts of time under AAA fire in karst mountain terrain naturally made pilots
extremely uncomfortable with the process. Prior to the development and
acceptance of of TRF (terrain following radar) in later years, it took nerves
of steel for a pilot to relinquish that much command and control of the
aircraft. Generally, no one clearly saw the target; just secondary explosions of
ammunition and fuel.
Combat Skyspot systems were managed by 1CEVG (Combat Evaluation Group,
SAC). Mission-tailored radar bombing units were later developed from 1CEVG
experience in SEA, called Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT's - pronounced "AS-RAT
" ). Later versions of the TSQ-96 system, known as the AN/TPB-1
(Tactical Pilotage Bombing) series contained resultingly more sophisticated
electronics, and provided upgraded digital computer systems with expanded
ordnance flight specifications, TACAN guidance, and ordnance release tones in
addition to navigational support for any TACAN-equipped aircraft for bombing,
tactical airlift cargo delivery or reconnaissance missions.
The later development of more sophisticated aircraft Inertial Navigation and
GPS Navstar guidance systems spelled the end of ground radar-assisted missions
for US Air Force operations, although it is still believed to be in use by USMC
and other countries today.
Other High Technology
Assets
Separate from Igloo White
operations, USAF IBM Model 1050 data terminals communicated immediate tactical,
strategic, logistical and administrative information over 1200- and 2400-bps
lines 24 hours a day to every air base, worldwide.
The USAF Directorate of Automated Systems at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam
had started in 1967 with a single IBM System 1410/1401, some Model 729 tape
drives and a 1301 RAM storage unit to manage 7th AF air targeting data and
mission tasking needs. By 1973, this had grown in complexity and capability to
two System 360/ Model 50 computers, Model 2305 DASD storage, Model 2400 tape
drives, and numerous System 1130/2250 communications terminals which were
linked via Long-Haul tropo-scatter radio or undersea cable (later, satellite)
to identical dual System 360's at HQ PACAF, Hickham AFB, Hawaii.
Although now sounding less sophisticated than
today's small office needs, the equipment was the best state-of-the-art,
leading edge processing technology available. This combination of hardware -
and software written by IBM, Control Data Corporation, and USAF - composed the Seek
Data II, CREST, and PIACCS systems (Pacific Interim Air
Force Command and Control). Towards the end of hostilities in Vietnam, 7th AF
transferred most of it to allied forces of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).
In October 1975 all of 7/13th AF Task Force Alpha IBM System 360/65 computer
mainframes and equipment at Nakhon Phanom were shipped back to CONUS
(Continental United States).
Sources
estimate that the TRIM project cost nearly $1 billion a year to operate.
The end of TFA
--- USSAG and other high-technology assets
The development of remote seismic, acoustic, magnetic and
infra-red sensors, and lighter airborne and ground receiver systems allowed the
incorporation of technology as a more common intelligence asset at increasingly
lower levels of command. Task Force Alpha was not just a sensor monitoring
facility; it was a complete strategic Intelligence analysis and evaluation
center. While the Igloo White
program was being decommissioned in 1973, MACV and 7th AF headquarters
at Tan Son Nhut AB, Saigon, relocated to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand.
Command
authority for all military operations in Southeast Asia was consolidated under
USSAG (United States Support Activities Group) at the former ISC. USSAG
subsumed remote sensors into its larger C3I mission profile
(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence). Mobile shelters brought
into the compound served as ground interface and analysis facilities, providing
remote sensor, photographic, ELINT, and SIGINT communications and support
capabilities for the Olymic
Torch U2's, real-time video reconnaissance Buffalo Hunter RPV
(remotely piloted vehicle) drone operations, and other 'Special Intelligence'
resources that were used to monitor and verify compliance with the terms of the
1973 Paris peace accords.
Among the many activities that were
managed there were Blue Chip (7AF Command Post), TEABALL (the Special
Intelligence Operations program center), and WCC (the Weapons Control Center).
The
'Combat Apple' EC-135
program departed in early 1974, and the 'Comfy Gator' EC-130 program also left that summer. At
about the time of the fall of Saigon in 1975, most COSVN/PAVN communications
had switched to landline and Manual Morse, and Olympic Torch was withdrawn.
Epilogue
One member of Task Force Alpha was
reported to have said '...We wired the Ho Chi Minh Trail like a drugstore
pinball machine, and we plugged in to it every night.'
The credibility of Task Force Alpha was often
brought into question when they identified targets where other Intelligence
resources claimed nothing existed. In a number of examples, targets located
inside the Laotian border near the DMZ were identified. Flight crews bombing
the designated target coordinates joked about attacking vicious banana trees,
but 'non-existent' fuel drums and ammunition caches produced secondary
explosions for days afterward.
The USAF claimed Igloo White to be responsible for destroying over 35,000
trucks, each carrying an average of 2.5 tons of supplies bound for South
Vietnam.
Official estimates were probably exaggerated by
overzealous public relations. A U.S. Senate report from 1971 (considering the
unsupportive nature of the Capitol Hill leadership for the Armed Services), was
not above using hyperbolae, noting that figures for '...truck kills claimed
by the Air Force last year...greatly exceeds the number of trucks believed by
the Embassy to be in all of North Vietnam.'
That only hints at the nature of political
in-fighting occurring between the State and Defense Departments at the time.
Daytime BDA (bomb damage assessment) flights rarely located the destroyed
vehicles. Traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail continued as the NVA developed
sensor decoy countermeasures and increased anti-aircraft weapons deployment.
Notes:
Information contained in this
document was found in archives, newsgroups, narratives, journals, emails from
individuals, conversations, and through various personal military experiences.
Data was - and continues to be - collected, collated and re-written to provide
a comprehensive view of one specific program that occurred over a period of ten
years (1965 to 1975) in Southeast Asia during the time of the Vietnam conflict.
Unofficial, official and personal web pages on the www were researched for any
and all information pertinent to the subject. At this date, no web pages have
been dedicated to Igloo White but it is hoped that one will soon surface for a
better account by those who worked in Task Force Alpha. For comments,
corrections, or complaints, please contact the author.
[Mooney
Documents - Part 6/Memorandum #7, Date: 9 February 1996]
To: Al Santoli, Dino Carluccio, Bill Bell
From: Jay Veith
re: Post-war Lao SIGINT concerning Americans
” After the American withdrawal in 1973, the U.S. began to dismantle its
intelligence gathering apparatus in SE Asia. The EC-135 called "Combat Apple" left in
early 1974, and the C-130 known as "Comfy Gator" departed in the
summer. NSA left the U-2 "Olympic Torch" to provide SIGINT coverage
to support the ARVNs. With the fall of Saigon and the war's end, most PAVN
communications had switched to landline and Manual Morse, so the U-2 was
withdrawn in 1976.”